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The Conflict over Bearden v Georgia
in State Courts:
Plea-Bargained Probation Terms and the
Specter of Debtors' Prison
Ann K. Wagnert
INTRODUCTION
The term "debtors' prison" may call to mind visions of an-
tique London-the indolent rake of Hogarth's prints or Little
Dorrit trudging home to the Marshalsea-but imprisonment for
civil debt flourished on American as well as British soil well into
the nineteenth century.1 For a variety of humanitarian and
practical reasons, public opinion gradually turned against the
practice, and in 1821 states began acting to outlaw imprisonment
for debt.2 Congress passed a statute forbidding the federal gov-
ernment to imprison civil debtors in states with such laws;3 at
the same time, new bankruptcy laws helped to make such drastic
remedies unnecessary. 4 Today most state constitutions explicitly
forbid imprisonment for civil debts. 5 The United States Con-
t BA 2002, University of Virginia; MA (English) 2003, University of Virginia; JD
Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 Mich L Rev 24, 29 (1926) (quoting an
estimate by an anti-debtors'-prison association in 1830 that three to five times as many
persons in Northern states were incarcerated for debt as for criminal offenses; the prac-
tice was less common in the South). But see Edwin T. Randall, Imprisonment for Debt in
America: Fact and Fiction, 39 Miss Valley Hist Rev 89, 98-102 (1952) (arguing that these
statistics are unreliable and that imprisonment for debt even in Northern states had all
but disappeared in the early nineteenth century).
2 Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 52 (Harvard 1935). See 28
USC § 2 007(a) ("A person shall not be imprisoned for debt on a writ of execution or other
process issued from a court of the United States in any State wherein imprisonment for
debt has been abolished.').
3 An Act to abolish imprisonment for debt in certain cases, 5 Stat 321 (1839), codi-
fied as amended at 28 USC § 2007(a).
4 See Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Inde-
pendence (Harvard 2002).
5 See, for example, Cal Const Art I § 10; Tex Const Art I § 18. Many state constitu-
tional provisions have been interpreted to apply only to debts arising out of contract, thus
excluding tort judgments and child support and alimony debts.
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384 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2010:
stitution is silent on the matter, though the Eighth and Thir-
teenth Amendments have been interpreted to prohibit debtors'
prison in some circumstances. 6
In the criminal context, however, the states have not been so
scrupulous, and de facto debtors' prisons persist. Imprisonment
for failure to pay a fine, restitution, or court costs can occur when
repayment is made a condition of probation or parole and the
defendant defaults.7
To some extent, the distinction between civil debts and debts
owed to the state is sensible. One of the unsettling aspects of his-
torical debtors' prisons was that the common-law writ of capias
ad satisfaciendum, used in conjunction with the writ of capias ad
respondendum, was a means by which individuals could elect to
send their fellow citizens to prison 8-a power that the modern
state usually reserves to itself. Thus, the fact that courts treat
civil debts differently than obligations that are imposed as part
of a criminal sentence may be partially explained by the fact that
in criminal cases, discretion is vested in the sentencing judge
rather than a vindictive creditor. However, the distinction is also
rationalized on the ground that court-imposed debts are punitive
in nature and substitute for incarceration or a longer sentence.
This argument neglects to consider that court-imposed debts are
not all alike. Court costs include contribution and recoupment,
recent legislative innovations that ask indigent defendants to
pay for their court-appointed counsel. 9 These costs cannot be
considered punitive: they are conceptually identical to a debt
owed to a private attorney (except in some cases, defendants
6 See, for example, US v Weldon, 568 F Supp 516, 532 (D Ala 1983) ("No one doubts
that simple and straight-forward imprisonment for debt violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment.'") (dictum), revd on other grounds,
US v Satterfield, 743 F2d 827 (11th Cir 1984); Alkire v Irving, 330 F3d 802, 816 (6th Cir
2003), citing US v Kozminski, 487 US 931, 943 (1988) ("The constitutional right against
imprisonment for failure to pay a debt is well established under both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits 'condition[s] in which the
victim is coerced by threat of legal sanction to work off a debt to a master.'"). See also
Abraham L. Freedman, Imprisonment for Debt, 2 Temple L Q 330, 355 (1928) ("The Con-
stitution of the United States contains no prohibitions of imprisonment for debt, except, it
is said, that the Thirteenth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the power of the
State to extend imprisonment for breach of obligations to such a degree as shall con-
stitute a substantial servitude.").
7 But see Ill Const Art I § 14 ("No person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine
in a criminal case unless he has been afforded adequate time to make payment, in
installments if necessary, and has willfully failed to make payment.").
8 See Freedman, 2 Temple L Q at 347 (cited in note 6).
9 See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for
Their Court-Appointed Counsel through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U Mich J L Ref
323, 331 (2009).
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were not informed there would be a charge for the services10 ).
And while it is true that many fines are imposed as an alter-
native to incarceration, some are levied pursuant to statutes that
do not even authorize imprisonment. 1'
Observing that "[t]he decision to place the defendant on pro-
bation ... reflects a determination by the sentencing court that
the State's penological interests do not require imprisonment,"
the Supreme Court in Bearden v Georgia12 constrained state
courts' ability to revoke probation for failure to pay fines, restitu-
tion, and court costs. 13 The Court held that when a defendant
violates a probation condition relating to the repayment of court-
imposed fines or restitution, the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that the sentencing court inquire into the reasons a
defendant has failed to pay.' 4 (This inquiry takes place during
the probation revocation hearing, already required under
Morrissey v Brewer15 and Gagnon v Scarpelli. 16) If the defendant
has the ability to pay, then the failure is deemed willful and
incarceration is permissible; if the defendant has made reason-
able attempts to gain the means to pay and yet cannot, through
no fault of his or her own, then the court must seek alternative
means of punishment and deterrence.1 7 By requiring a finding of
willfulness, Bearden prevented a revival of debtors' prison for
criminal defendants. No longer would mere inability to pay a
debt to the state be sufficient grounds for imprisonment.
Bearden was a narrow decision. It did not require an esti-
mate of ability to pay at initial sentencing, although one might
think that at least some repayment problems are avoided when
sentencing judges make an effort to do so.' 8 It drew a sharp line
10 See id at 349 ("Some statutes explicitly require that defendants be given notice of
possible recoupment debt prior to accepting appointed counsel. But in other jurisdictions,
courts have held that such notice is not required, and that failure to provide notice of
possible recoupment debt is not unconstitutional.") (citations omitted).
11 See Recent Legislation, Alabama Raises the Rates at Which Individuals in Jail for
Nonpayment of Fines Earn out Their Debts, 116 Harvard L Rev 735, 735 n 3 (2002).
12 461 US 660 (1983).
13 Id at 670.
14 Id at 672.
15 408 US 471 (1972) (holding that minimal procedural due process requirements
must be observed in parole-revocation hearings).
16 411 US 778, 782 (1973) (extending Morrissey to probation-revocation hearings).
17 Id.
18 But see San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 22 (1973)
("The Court has not held that fines must be structured to reflect each person's ability to
pay in order to avoid disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and often do,
consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in such circumstances they are guided by
sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.").
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between debt-related probation conditions, which trigger serious
Constitutional concerns and correspondingly painstaking legal
procedures, and ordinary probation conditions, which inspire no
such qualms. As the Court explained,
We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the proba-
tioner's lack of fault in violating a term of probation would
necessarily prevent a court from revoking probation. For
instance, it may indeed be reckless for a court to permit a
person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on
probation once it becomes evident that efforts at con-
trolling his chronic drunken driving have failed.... In
contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, how-
ever, the condition at issue here-indigency-is itself no
threat to the safety or welfare of society.19
The Court singled out indigency for special treatment not be-
cause poverty is accorded any unusual level of attention under
the Equal Protection Clause-indeed, San Antonio Independent
School District v Rodriguez had recently foreclosed that possibil-
ity 20-but more likely because, in the context of probation revoca-
tion, indigency raises the specter of debtors' prison. The Supreme
Court has never had an opportunity to address the constitution-
ality of debtors' prison directly, but an institutional discomfort
with the practice-"our traditional aversion to imprisonment for
debt,"21 as an earlier case put it-is the most persuasive explana-
tion for Bearden's heightened procedural requirements.
In the years since Bearden, some state courts have blurred
the line between debt-related probation terms and ordinary pro-
bation terms, allowing trial courts to skirt the Bearden mandate
that courts inquire into ability to pay before revoking probation.
Since Bearden addressed a fact pattern in which the defendant
had been sentenced by a trial court judge, these courts have
carved out an exception to Bearden in situations in which the
probationer has affirmatively agreed to pay as part of a plea bar-
gain.22 Other courts have resisted this shortcut, treating
negotiated pleas no differently than judge-initiated conditions. 23
19 Bearden, 461 US at 669 n 9 (citations omitted).
20 Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 28-29.
21 US v Bishop, 412 US 346, 352 (1973).
22 See, for example, State v Nordahl, 680 NW2d 247, 251-52 (ND 2004) (holding that
Bearden does not apply where a defendant has promised to pay restitution as part of a
plea bargain rather than a court-imposed sentence).
23 See, for example, Jordan v State, 939 SW2d 255 (Ark 1997) (holding that an in-
[2010:386
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Bearden contained no explicit exception for plea bargains, and
the courts that have deviated from its mandate often refer to pre-
Bearden state precedent to bolster their holdings. 24 Courts have
also justified their holdings with reference to the contract theory
of plea bargaining. 25 However, these courts neglect the crucial
difference between plea-bargained probation terms and ordinary
contracts: the penalty for breach of a contract has long since
ceased to be a prison sentence. 26
In the current economic climate, resolution of this split of
authority among state courts-which first emerged in the
1990s-takes on greater urgency. The rate of plea bargaining
increases during economic downturns when budgets for prosecu-
tors' and public defenders' offices are cut.27 Increased caseloads
for public defenders also make it less likely that plea bargains
reflect genuine negotiations over total obligations and payment
schedules. 28  Meanwhile, debt-related probation terms that
seemed reasonable to a defendant and defense counsel at the
height of the housing bubble--with its booming construction in-
dustry, a sector that has historically been more hospitable to
workers with criminal convictions 29-turn increasingly unrealis-
quiry into ability to pay was required by Bearden even when the defendant had promised
to pay restitution as part of a plea bargain).
24 See, for example, Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 250-51 (citing State v Thorstad, 261
NW2d 899 (ND 1978), as support for the proposition that inquiry into ability to pay is not
required where the defendant has promised to pay to restitution as part of a plea bar-
gain).
25 See, for example, Thorstad, 261 NW2d at 902 (reasoning in part that "[p]lea bar-
gaining has been officially accepted in North Dakota, and ... contract criteria have been
superimposed upon it. This gives the courts justification to treat court-approved plea
bargain agreements similarly to contracts.").
26 See, for example, Robert J. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the
Nineteenth Century 218 (Cambridge 2001) (describing the end of penal sanctions for
breach of employment contracts in 1870s England).
27 See Sheila K. Dean, Prosecutors Say Cuts Force Plea Bargains, NY Times B3 (Mar
10, 2004) ("Deep staffing cuts and increased caseloads are forcing prosecutors to accept
plea bargains they would never have considered otherwise, the city's district attorneys
said"); Michael Andersen, County Offers a Mix of Cuts, Taxes, The Columbian Al (Nov 21,
2009) ("'Ve are planning for a long recession,' [Clark County, Washington] Commissioner
Marc Boldt said Friday morning. 'Home growth, I think, isn't going to come back to where
it was.' Commissioners' proposals, which are not final, include: $690,112 from the county
prosecutor's office, including four attorneys, two support positions and a round of fur-
loughs. Office administrator Shari Jensen said such cuts would drive up caseloads and
increase plea bargaining.").
28 See Deborah Hastings, Nationwide, Public Defender Offices Are In Crisis, The
Associated Press (June 4, 2009), online at httpV/seattletimes.nwsource.con/html/nation
world/2009296604_apusnodefenseabridged.html (visited Oct 3, 2010) ("[E]ven in the best
of times, public defenders say a quick plea bargain is sometimes as good as it gets.").
29 See Jack Chang, Felons Face Reality of Outside World, Laws, Prejudice Make It
Hard to Get Work, Housing, Contra Costa Times Al (Aug 13, 2003) (describing industrial,
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tic as the economy sours. The budget crises faced by many state
and local governments have already led to other aggressive
strategies to collect debts from probationers, prompting highly
critical coverage in the press 30 and some litigation,3 ' but the plea-
bargain exception has not yet received a critical assessment.
This Comment argues that under Bearden there is no com-
pelling justification for treating plea-bargained probation terms
differently than judge-imposed probation terms. Both situations
raise the constitutionally troublesome prospect of debtors' prison.
The analogy between plea bargains and contracts, urged by some
state courts as a reason to deviate from Bearden, should instead
lead courts to approach plea bargains with the same concern
with which they approach judge-imposed sentences, particularly
because parity between sentences and plea bargains was the
original objective of the contract theory of plea bargains. Con-
versely, there are important differences between plea bargains
and contracts, and courts should avoid taking the analogy too
far, especially in the constitutionally delicate area of debt-related
probation terms. Contract theory aside, sending indigent defen-
dants directly to prison because they broke a plea-bargained
promise to pay contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment because
it does not allow for a valid determination of willfulness. Finally,
carving out a judge-made exception to Bearden is not justified by
pragmatic considerations.
warehouse, and construction jobs as the most likely employment options for parolees and
ex-felons); Kathleen Chapman, Job Market Tough for Ex-Convicts, Palm Beach Post 1C
(Mar 30, 2003) (reporting that in a survey of Palm Beach County, Florida, employers, a
quarter of all employers said they would consider hiring a former offender, while half of
employers in the manufacturing and construction industries would consider doing so).
30 See, for example, John Schwartz, As State Courts Face Cuts, A New Push to
Squeeze Defendants, NY Times A17 (Apr 7, 2009) (describing the Florida system of collec-
tion courts, which routinely jail debtor defendants for failing to appear in court, and not-
ing that "[a]s Florida's budget has tightened with the economic crisis, efforts to step up
the collections process have intensified, and court clerks say the pressure is on them to
bring in every dollar"); Editorial, Debtor's Prison-Again, St Petersburg Times 8A (Apr
14, 2009), (decrying Florida collection courts); Jody Lawrence-Turner, Debt to Society,
Spokesman Review Al (May 24, 2009) (describing in general terms the aggressive collec-
tion policy in Spokane County, Washington); Jody Lawrence-Turner, High Court Take
Criminal Fees Case, Spokesman Review AS (May 24, 2009) (explaining that a Spokane
county clerk visited every inmate booked into jail for charges relating to the failure to pay
court debts and asked him or her to sign an agreed order promising to adhere to a pay-
ment schedule for outstanding fines, restitution, and/or court costs-or return to jail).
31 See, for example, State v Nason, 233 P3d 848, 851-52 (Wash 2010) (holding, in a
case challenging the Spokane County policy described in note 30, that "[b]ecause due
process requires the court to inquire into [the defendant's] reason for nonpayment, and
because the inquiry must come at the time of the collection action or sanction, ordering
[the defendant] to report to jail without a contemporaneous inquiry into his ability to pay
violated due process").
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This Comment does not assert that courts must disregard
the fact that a debt-related probation term was agreed to as part
of a negotiated plea. To the contrary, this fact should be con-
sidered at the probation-revocation hearing in order to guard
against strategic behavior on the part of defendants. However,
agreeing to payment terms at one point in time should not be
treated as conclusive evidence of bad faith or ability to pay at a
later date.
I. BEARDEN v GEORGIA AND THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY AMONG
STATE COURTS
During the 1970s and '80s, the Supreme Court imposed in-
creasing restrictions on the practice of imprisoning criminal
defendants for failing to pay fines, restitution, and court costs.
The first major case in this area, Griffin v Illinois,32 established
that the Court would entertain equal protection and due process
claims with regard to the indigent status of criminal defendants,
and suggested that indigency might be a suspect classification. 33
On the subject of fines, the Supreme Court held in Williams v
Illinois3 4 that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, an indigent criminal defendant may not be
subjected to a prison term beyond the statutory maximum mere-
ly because he or she is unable to pay a fine or court costs.3 5 Again
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held in Tate v
Short3 6 that a state may not incarcerate an indigent defendant
under a fine-only statute for failure to pay the fine immediate-
ly.3 7 Citing these cases, Bearden then held:
[I]n revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or res-
titution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons
for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused
to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally
to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke pro-
bation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment with-
in the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the
probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide
32 351 US 12 (1956).
33 Id at 17 ("In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color.").
34 299 US 235 (1970).
35 Id at 240-41.
36 401 US 395 (1971).
37 Id at 399.
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efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must
consider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not ade-
quate to meet the State's interests in punishment and de-
terrence may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise
would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom
simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot
pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the
fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.38
The phrase "fundamental fairness" reflects the Court's under-
standing that the equal protection rationale of the earlier cases
was falling out of favor; substantive due process had become the
preferred mode of analysis. 39
This shift was necessary because shortly after Tate, the
Court had made clear that the poor are not a suspect class for
the purpose of equal protection analysis. 40 Mindful of this
precedent, Justice O'Connor in Bearden formally announced the
Court's holding under both the equal protection and due process
clauses, while suggesting in a footnote that the more suitable
mode of analyzing these questions might be substantive due
process:
A due process approach has the advantage in this context
of directly confronting the intertwined question of the role
that a defendant's financial background can play in
determining an appropriate sentence. When the court is
initially considering what sentence to impose, a defen-
dant's level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum
rather than a classification. Since indigence in this con-
text is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting
"the problem of this case into an equal protection frame-
work is a task too Procrustean to be rationally accom-
plished." The more appropriate question is whether con-
sideration of a defendant's financial background in setting
38 Bearden, 461 US at 672-3.
39 See Sundeep Kuthari, And Justice for All: The Role Equal Protection and Due
Proces Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents with Meaningful Access to the
Courts, 72 Tulane L Rev 2159, 2161-80 (1998).
40 Rodriguez, 411 US at 28-29 ("[T'his Court has never heretofore held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.").
[2010:390
THE CONFLICT OVER BEARDEN V GEORGIA
or resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a
denial of due process. 41
The question for state courts considering plea-bargained proba-
tion terms is the same: whether the decision to imprison the
defendant without assessing his or her ability to pay is so arbi-
trary or unfair as to be a denial of substantive due process.
Bearden addressed a criminal defendant who, having pled
guilty to burglary and theft of stolen property, was sentenced by
the trial court to three years on probation. 42 As a condition of
probation, the defendant was ordered to pay both a fine and res-
titution.43 After paying an initial installment, the defendant was
laid off from his job and he was unable to find new work.44
Although he informed the probation office that he would be un-
able to pay the remainder of his obligation on time, the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing, made no findings as to his
ability to pay, and revoked his probation. 45 Bearden made no
pronouncement about whether a plea-bargained probation term
would carve out an exception to the rule, but emphasized that
the reason courts were justified in imprisoning a defaulting pro-
bationer when an evidentiary hearing had determined that he or
she had the means to pay was that such a probationer had "will-
fully refused to pay."46
In the years since Bearden was decided, some courts have in-
ferred a willful refusal to pay at the time the probation term was
violated whenever a defendant had initially agreed to pay as part
of a plea bargain-regardless of how much time had intervened.
In State v Nordahl,47 the North Dakota Supreme Court looked
first to State v Thorstad,48 a North Dakota case decided prior to
Bearden that concluded on statutory and policy grounds that a
hearing to determine ability to pay was not required before the
defendant's probation could be revoked when the defendant had
agreed to pay restitution as part of a plea bargain and failed to
do So. 4 9
41 Bearden, 461 US at 667 n 8 (citation omitted).
42 Id at 662.
43 Id.
44 Id at 663.
45 Bearden, 461 US at 663.
46 Id at 668.
47 680 NW2d 247 (ND 2005).
48 261 NW2d 899 (ND 1978).
49 Id.
3831 391
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Surprisingly, the Thorstad court's reasoning survived
Bearden intact. The Nordahl court's post-Bearden analysis found
support in US v Mitchell,50 in which a military court had also
concluded that Bearden's hearing mandate did not apply to a
defendant's plea-bargained probation term.51 Mitchell contained
a relatively extensive discussion of why a finding of bad faith was
merited for this particular defendant:
Based on the record before him, the convening authority
was justified in concluding that appellant either bar-
gained in bad faith by misrepresenting his net worth, or
he failed to take reasonable steps to safeguard his assets
and convert them to cash after he was convicted and sen-
tenced. The record reflects that appellant either made a
bargain that he knew he could not keep, or he allowed his
assets to be dissipated instead of taking prompt and rea-
sonable measures to secure them. Either alternative con-
stitutes bad faith.52
The Mitchell holding does not necessarily recognize a blanket
rule that willfulness should be inferred whenever the defendant
has failed to adhere to the terms of a plea bargain,5 3 but uses the
plea bargain as one piece of evidence alongside either willful
misrepresentation at the time of the plea bargain ("made a bar-
gain he knew he could not keep") or reckless behavior thereafter
("allowed his assets to be dissipated instead of taking prompt
and reasonable measures to secure them"). This analysis,
although highly skeptical of the defendant, more or less accords
with Bearden's requirement that courts find that the defendant
"willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide
efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay."54 Still, the alter-
native finding of mere recklessness in "allow[ing] his assets to be
dissipated" is an exceedingly loose interpretation of Bearden, and
50 51 MJ 490 (US Armed Forces 1999).
51 See id at 494 (holding that "the Due Process Clause does not protect an accused
who offers to make full restitution, knowing full well that he cannot; nor does it protect
an accused who fails to take timely and reasonable steps to safeguard his assets so that
he can make restitution as promised").
52 Id.
53 But see id at 494 (Sullivan concurring) ("'A deal is a deal' sums up this case.
Appellant failed to live up to his pretrial agreement by paying full restitution. Therefore,
the convening authority lawfully vacated appellant's suspended sentence.").
54 Bearden, 461 US at 672.
392 [2010:
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probably represents the outer bounds of a proper willfulness
inquiry.
Though the Nordahl court claimed to be following Mitchell,
its holding went much further. The defendant in Nordahl had
entered into contracts to sell a future crop of hay and had accept-
ed some payment in advance, but he was not able to secure as
much land to grow the hay as he had expected. 55 Unfavorable
weather then reduced his yield. 56 The farmers he had contracted
with filed civil suits for damages, but also contacted the state's
attorney, who eventually charged Nordahl with felony theft of
property by deception.57 Nordahl pleaded this charge down to a
misdemeanor and agreed to probation and to pay $107,897.15 in
restitution.58 After making what would seem to qualify as
Bearden's "bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to
pay"59-including an attempt to sell a mortgage-encumbered bus
(naturally, the proceeds went to the bank) and an agreement to
sell the hay operation in which Nordahl would continue working
for the new owners-the trial court revoked his probation and
imposed a one-year sentence. 60
Affirming the trial court, the North Dakota Supreme Court
accepted what amounts to a negligence standard (assessed solely
at the time of the plea agreement) where the military court had
required a standard closer to recklessness or willfulness (meas-
ured from the point of the plea agreement through the revocation
hearing). The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that
"[u]nlike Bearden... Nordahl knew his financial situation before
he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney.
Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his
finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obliga-
tion."61 The court repeatedly emphasized it was not inquiring
into Nordahl's actual mental state, but merely judging him by a
reasonable-person standard: Nordhal "is presumed to have had
knowledge;" he "knew or should have known."62 Rather than




59 Bearden, 461 US at 672.
60 Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 249; Brief of Appellant, State v Nordahl, No 20030269 (ND
filed Dec 4, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23695907); Brief of Appellee, State v
Nordahl, No 20030269 (ND filed Dec 30, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL
23695906) (conceding that the facts were not in dispute).
61 Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 252 (emphasis added).
62 Id.
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serving as evidence of willfulness, the plea bargain was itself the
decisive element. 63 Analogizing the plea bargain to a contract,
the court quoted approvingly a revealing statement by the trial
judge:
[I]t would weigh more heavily with the Court if Mr. Nor-
dahl had been ordered by the Court to pay restitution,
then I would be more concerned with his ability to pay
and the circumstances that have prevented him from pay-
ing. The fact is, he made a promise as part of his plea
agreement that he would pay. He's violated that agree-
ment. There may be circumstances that justify that. But,
for whatever reason, he's violated that agreement and
therefore he is in violation of the Court Order. I agree
with Mr. Secrest, this is in criminal court. The con-
sequence of violating the Court's Order is that the Court
will revoke his sentence and impose a new sentence. 64
Nordhal's state of mind was no longer the focus of the inquiry;
rather, in light of the plea bargain, it was irrelevant.
Similar decisions have been reached in lower state and fed-
eral courts, including a federal district court in Alabama (US v
Johnson65), a Kentucky appellate court (Gamble v Common-
wealth66), and a Georgia appellate court (Dickey v State67); other
courts have held that defendants whose plea bargain included an
explicit promise not to plead indigence had waived their right to
an inquiry into ability to pay later on. 68 Courts have also refused
63 Id at 251 ("Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden
case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agree-
ment; rather, restitution was imposed by the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. In this
case, Nordahl agreed to the restitution amount and agreed to the due date in a plea
agreement.") (citation omitted).
64 Id at 253.
65 767 F Supp 243, 248 (ND Ala 1991) (distinguishing Bearden on the grounds that
the "restitution obligations were carefully bargained for after notice to the victims").
66 293 SW3d 406, 411-13 (Ky App 2009) (distinguishing Bearden on the grounds that
it did not address plea-bargained probation terms, but holding in the alternative that the
defendant waived his right to an inquiry by refusing to testify at the revocation hearing).
67 570 SE2d 634, 636 (Ga App 2002) (holding that Bearden does not apply to plea-
bargained probation terms).
68 See Wright v State, 610 So2d 1187 (Ala Crim App 1992) ("In the usual case in
which restitution is imposed by the court, a factual determination of indigence is appro-
priate before a defendant is incarcerated for nonpayment. In the present case, however,
such a determination would be irrelevant. Here, the appellant helped to formulate the
conditions of a plea agreement that included the specific consequence of revocation of
probation for failure to pay restitution. He specifically waived the right to plead poverty
in the event of such nonpayment.").
[2010:394
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to extend Bearden in the related but factually distinct scenario in
which the restitution was not agreed to as a condition of proba-
tion, but was instead promised prior to formal sentencing. 69
These decisions are sometimes cited in support of the cases hold-
ing that Bearden does not apply to plea-bargained probation
terms, but pre-sentencing agreements usually involve much
shorter repayment periods during which dramatically changed
circumstances are less likely. Moreover, in Bearden, the fact that
a judge had at some point determined that prison was un-
necessary played an important role: "The decision to place the
defendant on probation, however, reflects a determination by the
sentencing court that the State's penological interests do not
require imprisonment." 70 In pre-sentencing agreement cases, this
determination was never made.
Other courts, in contrast, treat negotiated pleas no different-
ly than judge-imposed conditions.71 Most are primarily concerned
with conforming their decisions to state mandatory authority
and Bearden, and in the absence of precedent to the contrary,
they summarily dismiss any effort to distinguish plea-bargained
conditions and judge-imposed conditions. 72 Rejecting the charac-
69 See Commonwealth v Payne, 602 NE2d 594 (Mass App 1992) (holding that
Bearden did not apply to a pre-sentencing restitution requirement imposed after the
physician defendant had agreed to a plea-bargained probation term requiring restitution
within six weeks); Sichenzia v Supreme Court, Suffolk County, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 1582
(EDNY) (denying a habeas petition on the grounds that Bearden did not apply to a plea
bargain requiring defendant to pay partial restitution prior to sentencing and to complete
restitution payments within ninety days of a sentence imposing both a prison term and
probation); Patton v State, 458 NE2d 657, 660 (Ind App 1984) (holding that Bearden did
not apply to a plea bargain requiring the payment of restitution prior to sentencing).
70 Bearden, 461 US at 670.
71 See, for example, State v Myles, 882 So2d 1254, 1256-57 (La App 2004) (applying
the Bearden requirement that a trial court must inquire into ability to pay before revok-
ing probation to a plea-bargained probation term); Dirico v State, 728 So2d 763, 767 (Fla
App 1999) (holding that a plea agreement that included, as a condition of probation, a
waiver of the defense of inability to pay was illegal under Bearden); Jordan, 939 SW2d
255 (holding that an inquiry into ability to pay was required by Bearden even when the
defendant had promised to pay restitution as part of a plea bargain); Molina's v Commis-
sioner of Correction, 652 A2d 481 (Conn 1994) (granting on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Connecticut statutes the habeas petition of a prisoner who remained in
prison solely due to his inability to pay the "committed fine" he had agreed to as part of
his plea bargain).
72 See, for example, Dirico, 728 So2d at 766 ("Upon closer review ... however, we do
not believe that the supreme court intended to limit its disapproval of the waiver of the
defense of inability to pay to those circumstances where the waiver was judge initiat-
ed.... [I]t seems that the supreme court was distinguishing Doherty not because it in-
volved a negotiated plea, as opposed to a judge-initiated condition, but because the
supreme court believed ... that the agreement in Doherty was somehow atypical because
the defendant himself had taken some extraordinary measures in seeking to have the
trial court accept, as part of the plea, his agreement to waive inability to pay as a defense
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terization of plea bargains as purely private contracts, these
courts note that the trial judge must approve any proposed
agreement. The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, observed
that "[iun agreeing to the plea bargain, the State recognized that
its interest in punishment and deterrence did not require im-
prisonment, but would be satisfied by probation and restitu-
tion."73 Beyond these cursory distinctions, however, no court has
engaged in a sustained defense of treating plea-bargained and
judge-imposed probation terms identically for the purposes of
Bearden inquiries. Tellingly, neither the courts that consider
plea bargains an exception to Bearden nor the courts that believe
Bearden controls plea-bargained probation terms have discussed
contrary authority in other jurisdictions in any detail.
II. THE ANALOGY TO PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Courts that refuse to extend Bearden to plea-bargained pro-
bation terms often justify their position by drawing an analogy
between plea bargains and contracts. 74 Plea bargains resemble
private contracts in that each party makes concessions (the
defendant waives the right to trial by jury; the prosecution
agrees to a reduced sentence) in order to achieve a more highly
desired outcome (the defendant receives a reduced sentence; the
prosecution conserves resources and secures a conviction). 75
But when academics argue that plea bargains should be
"enforceable," they are usually arguing against scholars such as
Albert W. Alschuler, who maintain that the entire process is
tainted by coercion and should be abolished. 76 The claim that a
to any failure to pay the restitution. Since the instant case does not involve some extraor-
dinary act on the part of the defendant above and beyond agreeing to the terms of the
negotiated plea, we find that Stephens controls and that the condition of probation waiv-
ing [the defendant's] defense of inability to pay is illegal."). See also People v Wilkes, 232
Ill App 3d 669, 671-2 (1992) (rejecting the state's argument that "this is not a question of
the defendant being penalized from the Court's standpoint. It's a question of there having
been an agreement which the State carried out on their side and the defendant did not
carry out on his" because the Illinois constitution [cited in note 7] specifically mandates a
finding of willfulness before a criminal defendant may be imprisoned for failure to pay a
fine).
73 Jordan, 939 SW2d at 255.
74 See Thorstad, 261 NW2d at 902 (reasoning in part that "[pllea bargaining has been
officially accepted in North Dakota, and ... contract criteria have been superimposed
upon it. This gives the courts justification to treat court-approved plea bargain agree-
ments similarly to contracts."); Dickey, 570 SE2d at 636 (characterizing plea bargain
exception decisions in other jurisdictions as "rely[ing] on principles of contract law").
75 Robert E. Scott and William J. Stunts, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L J
1909, 1909 (1992).
76 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal L Rev 652
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plea bargain should be enforceable because it resembles a private
contract leads to the conclusion that the resulting negotiated
sentence should be treated as an equal substitute for and in the
same manner as a judge-imposed sentence, not that it should be
treated as an inferior form of sentence, stripped of post-
sentencing procedural safeguards.
At the same time, plea-bargained probation terms differ
from private contracts in one important way: while breach of pri-
vate contract leads only to damages, breach of a probation condi-
tion strips the defendant of his or her personal liberty. Ordinary
contractual debts never lead to imprisonment because of "our
traditional aversion to imprisonment for debt"77 and state con-
stitutional prohibitions. Indeed, some scholars defend the en-
forceability of plea bargains precisely by pointing out that they
are not contracts for enslavement. As Robert E. Scott and
William J. Stunts argue, "The defendant's liberty is not being
traded for something else; rather, a risk of 'enslavement' (prison)
is being traded for a certainty of somewhat less enslavement."78
This is not always true of probation conditions. Defendants
agreeing to probation terms may have committed minor crimes
that would not normally result in a prison sentence.79 In these
cases, the risk of loss of personal liberty is as much introduced by
the plea bargain as it is foreclosed by it. Even in the more com-
mon scenario, where a defendant is trading the possibility of
a longer prison sentence for probation and a promise to pay
restitution on some future schedule, the trade is one kind of
(1981) (arguing that plea bargaining is an "inherently unfair and irrational process");
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U Chi L Rev 3, 13 (1978) ("Plea bar-
gaining, like torture, is coercive.").
77 US v Bishop, 412 US 346, 352 (1973).
78 Scott and Stunts, 101 Yale L J at 1929 (cited in note 75).
79 See Alabama Raises the Rates, 116 Harvard L Rev at 735 n 3 (cited in note 11)
("[Ulnder this scheme, incarceration may proceed from infractions as (relatively) benign
as traffic offenses and disorderly conduct, offenses that the sentencing judge did not find
to merit incarceration ex ante, or the underlying proscriptive statutes of which do not
even authorize imprisonment."). For an example of probation being imposed where the
underlying violation would not have merited a prison sentence, see People v Gill, 258
NW2d 493, 495 (Mich App 1977) (affirming a sentence of a $10 fine plus costs and six
months probation for operating an unregistered motorcycle on a university campus even
though the underlying ordinance specified a maximum penalty of a $25 fine). For an
example of a much higher sentence being imposed after revocation than would have been
imposed initially, see United States v Green, 162 Fed Appx 283 (5th Cir 2006) (affirming a
revocation sentence significantly higher than the recommended Sentencing Guidelines
range for the original offense and noting that the district court judge "wished to provide
[the defendant] with an opportunity to participate in a comprehensive substance abuse
treatment program provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons").
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uncertainty for another. The defendant's liberty is made a sub-
ject of the damages clause.
Again, this fact does not mean that debt-related probation
conditions should not be allowed in plea bargains. As Scott and
Stunts point out,
Liberty is too important to be allocated by unregulated
bargaining. The potential for irrationality and mistake to
work irrevocable, life-destroying injustice is too high not
to police the bargain. But that is the point-the argument
does not imply doing away with plea bargaining; it only
implies regulating plea bargains to a greater extent than
we regulate other contracts.80
Courts should police debt-related probation conditions much
more carefully than they would police contracts with ordinary
damages clauses. The fact that the defendant's liberty is at stake
means that prosecution arguments to the effect that revocation is
merited simply because the plea agreement has been breached
cannot be accepted complacently.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS
Under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, the
question whether courts may carve out an exception to the
Bearden inquiry for probationers who agreed to their sentence
through a plea bargain depends on "the fundamental fairness" of
revoking probation regardless of present ability to pay.81 Under
Bearden, a sentencing court may revoke probation if it finds that
"the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make suffi-
cient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay."8 2
The probationer's state of mind is critical to this determination.
The primary standard is clearly willfulness, although reckless-
ness-being indifferent to whether the debt is paid and refusing
to take steps to ensure that it is-may also suffice, depending on
how courts read the "bona fide efforts" standard.
Courts that favor a plea bargain exception seem to approach
this issue in one of two ways. The first is to use the fact of
the plea bargain as evidence that the defaulting probationer
acted willfully-or, in the Mitchell court's somewhat looser
80 Scott and Stunts, 101 Yale L J at 1930 (cited in note 75) (emphasis in original).
81 Bearden, 461 US at 673.
82 Id at 672.
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terminology, that he acted in bad faith.8 3 Under the Mitchell
approach, a plea agreement, standing alone, presumably would
not justify the sentencing court in making a determination of
willful refusal to pay. However, the sentencing court could con-
sider the totality of the circumstances, including the probation-
er's original affirmative agreement to pay, in deciding whether
the present failure to pay was willful. This approach comports
with Bearden and the Fourteenth Amendment, though it seems
unnecessary and possibly misleading to announce a formal
exception to the Bearden rule, or to create a rebuttable presump-
tion that a plea-bargaining probationer has acted willfully. When
a sentencing court takes this evidentiary approach, it is conduct-
ing an inquiry into ability to pay. It simply acknowledges that an
affirmative agreement to pay at sentencing reduces the probabil-
ity that the probationer later failed to pay "through no fault of
his own."8 4
The second approach, typified by the Nordahl court and the
Mitchell concurrence, permits a sentencing court to infer willful-
ness at the time the probationer violated his probation condition
solely on the basis of a plea agreement made months and some-
times years earlier.85 This shortcut contradicts Bearden and
violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is unconcerned
with the subjective intent of the probationer. The Nordahl court,
for example, is content with a finding of mere negligence, wholly
divorced from the probationer's actual state of mind.8 6 When
Nordahl argues that he made a "good faith effort to make pay-
ment of the restitution obligation, but was unable to do so,"87 the
court counters that "Nordahl agreed to the restitution amount
and agreed to the due date in a plea agreement"88 and that
Nordahl "knew or should have known the encumbrances on his
assets could frustrate his ability to liquidate and fulfill the resti-
tution obligation."8 9 In this approach, the court announces a rule
that Bearden is simply inapplicable to plea-bargained probation
conditions. 90 It also fails to take into consideration the possibility
83 Mitchell, 51 M at 494.
84 Bearden, 461 US at 673.
85 See Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 253; Mitchell, 51 MJ at 494 (Sullivan concurring).
86 Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 252.
87 Id at 250.
88 Id at 251.
89 Id at 252.
90 See State v Jacobsen, 746 NW2d 405, 410 (ND 2008) (reiterating the holding that
"[in State v Nordahl, this Court held that Bearden does not apply when restitution is
ordered as part of a plea agreement") (citation omitted).
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that the probationer's circumstances may have changed in the
intervening months or years since he or she agreed to the proba-
tion condition or that the probationer might have innocently
overestimated the reasonableness of the repayment schedule.
Accepting provisionally the Nordahl court's confidence that
defendants make rational projections about their ability to pay
fines, restitution, and court costs, the courts still must contend
with the possibility of radically changed financial circumstances.
In Bearden itself, the defendant became unable to pay only after
losing his job. 91 The facts of Jordan v State,92 in which the
Arkansas Supreme Court refused to carve out an exception to
Bearden, concerned a defendant who had lost his job after agree-
ing to pay restitution as part of a plea bargain. 93
Particularly during a recession, it is entirely plausible that a
probationer might be laid off and unable to find another job.
Current unemployment and underemployment estimates are
over 17 percent. 94 Calling inability to pay in such circumstances
"willful" is akin to saying the defendant willed the recession.
Health care costs, the most frequent cause of bankruptcy in the
United States,95 are another source of unexpected financial bur-
dens. A defendant could also be surprised by the cost of providing
for a new child or caring for an infirm parent.
In the context of debts where the penalty for default is the
deprivation of conditional liberty,96 caution about taking judicial
shortcuts is also warranted by the role cognitive biases may play
in the plea agreement itself. Such factors as optimism bias and
hyperbolic discounting, which enter into even the most optimal
91 Bearden, 461 US at 662-63.
92 939 SW2d 255 (Ark 1997).
93 Id at 256.
94 See Peter S. Goodman, 85,000 More Jobs Cut in December, Fogging Outlook, NY
Times Al (Jan 8, 2010) ("The nation lost 85,000 jobs from the economy in December, the
Labor Department reported Friday, as hopes for a vigorous recovery ran headlong into
the prospect that paychecks could remain painfully scarce into next year .... Mark Zandi,
chief economist at Moody'sEconomy.com, forecasts that the unemployment rate will reach
10.8 percent by October [2010]. The so-called underemployment rate-which counts peo-
ple who have given up looking for work and those who are working part time for lack of
full-time positions-now sits at 17.3 percent.").
95 See David U. Himmelstein, et al, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007:
Results of a National Study, 122 A J Medicine 741, 743 (2009) ("Illness or medical bills
contributed to 62.1% of all bankruptcies in 2007.").
96 See Morrissey, 408 US at 482 ("[The liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate,
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a
'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to
deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.'
By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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decision making,97 may lead defendants to agree to fines or resti-
tution payments that do not reflect rational projections of earn-
ing potential and available assets during the probationary
period. Optimism bias has most often been discussed in the plea-
bargaining context as a factor that leads defendants to over-
estimate their chances at trial.98 But overconfidence may also
come into play when a defendant is projecting his or her future
earning ability, especially in the wake of a new criminal convic-
tion. Research has shown that overconfidence is a significant
problem in "evaluating the likelihood of succeeding at a difficult
task."99 Raising the money required to adequately compensate a
victim in restitution will often present a challenge for indigent
defendants.100 The closer to impossible a task becomes, the more
pronounced the "difficulty effect" on predictions of success. 101
Optimism bias is also pronounced when people have a measure
of control over outcomes. 10 2 Probationers certainly have some
control over whether or not they work. Ultimately, however,
cheery predictions made at sentencing will have to contend with
the impact of a new or lengthier criminal record on earning
potential.10 3 A sudden economic shift like the present downturn
is another potential drag on real-world ability to pay.'0 4
97 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471 (1998).
98 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv L
Rev 2463, 2498-2502 (2004).
99 Id at 2501, citing Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and
the Determinants of Confidence, 24 Cognitive Psych 411, 425-28 (1992).
100 See Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts 1 (Bureau of
Justice Assistance and Council of State Governments Justice Center 2007), online athttpV/www.reentrypolicy.org/jcpublications/repaying debts full report;file (visited Oct 3,
2010) ("Most people released from prisons and jails have few financial resources. It is
unlikely their financial outlook will improve soon after their return to the community. On
average, people released from prison are about 34 years old. Typically, 90 percent of these
individuals are male, and more than half are African-American or Latino. They have
little education and few marketable job skills. Generally, they return to the neighbor-
hoods they came from or similar locales, where job opportunities are particularly lim-
ited.") (citations omitted).
101 Griffin and Tversky, 24 Cognitive Psych at 426 (cited in note 99).
102 See Bibas, 117 Harv L Rev at 2501 (cited in note 98).
103 See Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 Wisc L
Rev 617, 622-24 & nn 22-30, 642 (2005) (reviewing survey studies that observed a strong
and significant negative correlation between incarceration and income or probability of
current employment and reporting the results of an experimental audit, which isolated a
statistically significant causal effect of prior incarceration on callback rates for entry-level
jobs).
104 See James Marschall Borbely, U.S. Labor Market in 2008: Economy in Recession,
Monthly Labor Review 3, 6-13 (Bureau of Labor Statistics March 2009), online at
http/www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/03/artlfull.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (noting that blacks,
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Another cognitive bias that might affect repayment-related
plea bargains is hyperbolic discounting, a concept which may be
briefly defined by the maxim "a day of freedom today is worth
more than a day of freedom ten years from now."10 5 Even if the
defendant has little rational reason to expect to be able to adhere
to the probation term in question, he or she may miscalculate the
burden of the prosecution's proffered repayment schedule be-
cause the payments take place in the future, whereas the alter-
native prospect of being sentenced to additional prison time is a
present threat. This tendency is exacerbated by the nature of the
plea bargaining process, in which time is tightly constrained and
the prosecution often sets the terms of the initial proposal.
As empirical research has shown, defendants are not always in
a position to actively negotiate the terms of plea offers, and they
frequently accept prosecution proposals in the form they are
presented.106
Finally, carving out a blanket exception to Bearden for plea-
bargained probation terms would undermine current Supreme
Court precedent. Ninety-five percent of convictions today are
obtained by guilty plea.10 7 The rates may be even higher for those
defendants whom the mandate is designed to protect: Indigent
defendants are more likely to be represented by public defenders
or involuntarily appointed lawyers, whose workload and method
of compensation make plea bargains far more attractive than
going to trial.108 In light of these practical realities, courts that
endorse the plea-bargain exception have, in effect, narrowed
Bearden into irrelevancy.
Hispanics, and those with less education suffered the biggest increases in unemployment
rate in 2008, while the most jobs were shed by the construction industry).
105 Bibas, 117 Harv L Rev at 2504 (cited in note 98).
106 See Malcom M. Feely, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower
Criminal Court 187 (Russell Sage 1992) ("Discussions of plea bargaining conjure up im-
ages of a Middle Eastern bazaar, in which each transaction appears as a new and distinct
encounter, unencumbered by precedent and past association. Each transaction involves
higgling and haggling anew, in an effort to obtain the best possible deal. American lower
courts have a different reality. They are more akin to modern supermarkets in which
prices for various commodities have been clearly established and labeled. Arriving at an
exchange in this context is not an explicit negotiation and bargaining process-You do
this for me and I'll do that for you'-designed to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
To the extent that there is any negotiation at all, it is debate over the nature of the case,
and hinges largely on establishing the relevant 'facts' which flow from various interpreta-
tions of the police report....").
107 Michael M. OTear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 Ga L Rev 407, 409
(2008).
108 See Bibas, 117 Harv L Rev at 2477-82 (cited in note 98).
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It is, of course, likely that in many cases there will be no ev-
idence of changed circumstances and the impact of cognitive
biases will be negligible. It seems at least possible that some
defendants, knowing that indigent status prevents a court
from incarcerating a probationer for failure to pay, will behave
strategically at sentencing, agreeing to wildly unrealistic restitu-
tion figures without any intention of adhering to the repayment
schedule. Similarly, highly informed probationers may deliber-
ately seek out post-sentencing obligations that impair their abil-
ity to pay. The possibility of such bad-faith behavior was one of
the primary concerns of the Nordahl court.10 9 Nonetheless, the
existence of an opportunity for bad faith does not justify a
presumption of bad faith. Under the Bearden inquiry, a court has
ample authority to probe both why the probationer initially
believed he or she would be able to pay and why that prediction
unraveled.
IV. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to legal arguments about whether Bearden
applies to plea bargains, there are several policy considerations
that make carving out a plea-bargain exception inadvisable. The
inquiry into ability to pay takes place during an already man-
dated probation-revocation hearing and thus does not add signif-
icantly to the judiciary's administrative costs. By preventing
defendants who truly cannot pay from being subjected to coercive
incarceration, the state avoids the significant costs of imprison-
ing them.110 At the same time, nothing about Bearden prevents
probation officers from threatening to revoke probation for failure
to pay, so the prospect of imprisonment remains a powerful
stimulus to payment. Finally, courts that recognize the efficiency
of plea bargaining should realize that stripping plea bargains of
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees may have the effect of dis-
incentivizing their formation.
Bearden applies not only to failure to pay restitution, where
the defendant owes money to one or more victims, but to also
fines and court costs, which are owed directly to the state. When
109 Nordahl, 680 NW2d at 252 ("[A]llowing a defendant to avoid restitution by sub-
sequently pleading indigency after entering into a valid plea agreement would cause a
windfall to the defendant").
110 In 2001, the average annual cost of incarcerating an inmate in state prison was
$22,650, but costs ranged from a low of $8,128 (Alabama) to a high of $44,379 (Maine).
James J. Stephan, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison Expenditures, 2001 2-3 (DOJ
2004).
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a sentencing court is considering revoking probation because of a
failure to pay a debt directly to the state, purely economic con-
siderations may come into play. As Justice Brennan observed in
Tate, imprisoning an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine
or court costs not only prevents the defendant from acquiring the
means to pay but also imposes the additional cost of his or her
confinement on the state.111 Although empirical data cannot dis-
tinguish between those individuals who are truly unable to pay a
fine or fee and those who have refused to do so, some studies
suggest that the administrative cost associated with collection or
incarceration not infrequently outweighs the revenue collected
thereby. 112 This argument applies with even more force to fees
that states have applied solely to raise revenue. These "legal
financial obligations" or "court costs" attempt to recoup from the
defendant the cost of, for example, the individual's initial arrest,
a public defender, or the probation officer. 113 The goal of saving
taxpayers money by imposing the cost of prosecution on defen-
dants is entirely undercut by imprisoning those who cannot pay.
At the same time, empirical research has shown that the
threat of incarceration is particularly effective at persuading
probationers to repay their court-ordered financial obligations. 11
4
The prospect of prison time may also be a powerful incentive to
secure employment, assuming employment is both available and
accessible to the probationer. By placing the court's obligation to
inquire into ability to pay at the probation revocation hearing
rather than at initial sentencing, the Bearden standard (which
instructs courts to make a determination as to whether the
defendant "failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to
111 Tate, 401 US at 399.
112 See Rebecca Diller, Judith Greene, and Michelle Jacobs, Maryland's Parole Super-
vision Fee: A Barrier to Reentry 23 (Brennan Center for Justice 2009) (describing the
costly administrative burden associated with collection of a relatively small parole super-
vision fee in Virginia), online at http;//www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
marylandsparole supervisionfee_a_barrier-to-reentry/ (visited Oct 3, 2010); Rhode
Island Family Life Center, Court Debt and Related Incarceration in Rhode Island 19
(2007) (estimating that 17 percent of Rhode Island cases in which individuals were jailed
for failure to pay court debts resulted in a net loss for the state), online at
http/opendoorsri.org/courtdebtreform (visited Oct 3, 2010).
113 See Anderson, 42 U Mich J L Ref at 327-40 (cited in note 9) (noting that the
majority of states use recoupment or contribution as a means to collect defense costs from
defendants).
114 See David Weisburd, Tomer Einat, and Matt Kowalski, The Miracle of the Cells:
An Experimental Study of Interventions to Increase Payment of Court-Ordered Financial
Obligations, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol 9, 31 (2008) (finding that the threat of probation viola-
tion was the most effective means of recovering court-ordered financial obligations from
probationers).
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acquire the resources to pay") is designed so that the willfulness
determination functions as a safety valve, allowing the deterrent
power of a prison term to influence the probationer's conduct
consistently until the probation revocation hearing.
Plea bargaining allows courts to process many more cases at
a lower cost than would be possible if the practice were eliminat-
ed.115 Courts that value the efficiency of the plea bargaining sys-
tem should be wary of any rule that reserves additional con-
stitutional rights to judge-imposed sentences, since zealous
defense attorneys will alert their clients to the hidden cost of
bargaining over debt-related probation terms. Perhaps it is un-
realistic to think that procedural deprivations alone will
dissuade many defendants from entering into plea bargains,
given the powerful incentives that push defendants, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors in the other direction. But even an
incremental shift away from plea bargains could strain the
resources of state judicial systems. In the current economic
climate, states would be well advised not to experiment with
incentives that have the potential to change the way defendants
and their attorneys evaluate the relative risk exposure of plea
bargains and trials.
CONCLUSION
Bearden v Georgia reflects the longstanding intuition that in the
United States, individuals-whether criminal defendants or civil
debtors-should not be incarcerated because they are unable to
meet their financial obligations. In the intervening years, state
courts have carved out a plea-bargain exception to this guarantee
that threatens to swallow the rule, and still more may be
tempted to do so as the recession strangles state budgets and
puts greater pressure on courts to extract fines and fees from
probationers. The economic tailspin also makes it more likely
that criminal defendants will be asked to agree to plea bargains
rather than go to trial, puts probationers at greater risk of
indigence, and increases the chances that probationers' personal
wealth and employment prospects at probation revocation hear-
ings will have deteriorated in the time since they entered into
their original plea agreements. The comparison of plea bargains
to contracts fails-in light of due process requirements set forth
in Bearden and more pragmatic considerations-to justify a
115 See Scott and Stunts, 101 Yale L J at 1932 (cited in note 75) (describing the perni-
cious consequences that would follow from the abolition of plea bargaining).
383] 405
406 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
blanket plea-bargain exception to Bearden. When the evidence
warrants, courts may take into consideration the fact that the
debt-related probation term was agreed to as part of a plea
bargain, but such a fact is properly understood as one piece of
evidence to be weighed alongside others at a probation revocation
hearing.
